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Although a relationship between established democratic political systems and 
environmental capacity has been described, the impact of the democratisation 
process on environmental capacity is not clear. The aim of this article is to 
determine the effect of both prior regime type and mode of transition on 
environmental capacity, through consideration of the cases of Bulgaria, 
Portugal, Romania and Spain. In addition, the importance of the European 
Union (EU) as an external actor shaping environmental capacity building is 
assessed. Findings indicate that variations in prior regime type and mode of 
transition had limited impact on environmental capacity development. Of 
greater importance were the persistent non-democratic legacies that 
influenced behaviours and actions during the democratisation period. The 
requirements of the EU were fundamental in ensuring environmental issues 
remained on the domestic political agenda. 
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Introduction 
Previous studies have shown that democratic states perform better than non-
democratic states when dealing with a range of environmental issues (see Li and 
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Reuveny, 2006; Ward, 2008; Winslow, 2005). Stronger performance in this area has 
been linked to the degree of openness within democratic systems, allowing for issues 
of concern to the public to be identified and addressed (see Barry, 1999; Dryzek, 
1988; Lidskog and Elander, 2007). These negative feedback mechanisms provide 
legitimate channels for the expression of discontent and sharing of information with 
the state (Dryzek, 1988). Although this does not preclude the failure of democratic 
states to address environmental issues (Blühdorn, 2013), opportunities for effective 
remedies to be identified and implemented are increased.1  
The impact of moving from authoritarianism to democracy on environmental 
performance has been less well described than the effect of regime type per se. There 
is no predetermined path to democracy; each state democratises within the specific 
contextual constraints it faces (Tilly, 2004). The uncertainty inherent within 
democratisation may present challenges to the development of environmental capacity 
in the short-term, as institutions and relationships are established and redefined. The 
nature of the democratisation process therefore requires consideration. This article 
focuses on two aspects in particular: the prior (non-democratic) regime type, and the 
mode of transition. Hite and Morlino (2004) argue that the form of prior regime type 
is important as it determines the non-democratic legacy and structures that 
democratising agents must either work with or challenge. The mode of transition can 
help determine whether there is a more complete break with the previous non-
democratic regime, or a degree of continuation (Munck and Leff, 1997). Together, 
these characteristics determine the configuration of actors and structure shaping the 
democratisation process. 
The aim of this article is to determine the effects of prior regime type and 
mode of transition on environmental capacity, by examining democratisation in the 
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four European states of Bulgaria, Portugal, Romania, and Spain. 
Research on democratisation has highlighted the importance of external 
influences on democratisation and on the decisions made by democratising states 
(Tolstrup, 2013). Examining states that have partially democratised, Levitsky and 
Way (2010) argue that the degree to which a state is integrated into the international 
political system plays an important role in determining whether democracy will be 
achieved. This issue is significant in the cases examined this article, as each received 
support from the European Union (EU) during their respective democratisation. 
Although the EU was important in supporting democratisation, the extent to which it 
has influenced domestic policy-making has been contested (see Goetz, 2001). It is 
therefore important to determine whether EU support penetrated to the level of 
domestic policy-making and shaping changes in environmental capacity. 
The article begins by examining the literature on democratisation and 
environmental capacity, with a focus on the key arguments and the nature of the 
relationship. Following this, the second section describes the methodology for this 
study, detailing the interviews conducted and the supplementary data assessed. In the 
third section, the article examines the characteristics and development of 
democratisation and environmental capacity in Bulgaria, Portugal, Romania, and 
Spain. The final section considers the relationship between CO2 emissions and GDP 
in the four countries, before bringing together the findings to address the core aim of 
the paper. 
 
Democratisation and Environmental Capacity 
 Democratisation of a state is a complex, fluid process, involving significant 
upheaval as roles are redefined and institutions rebuilt. In a review of the literature, 
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Shin (1994, 143; see also Schneider and Schmitter, 2004) identified four common 
stages: decay of non-democratic rule, transition, consolidation, and maturation of the 
political order. Although there have been disagreements about the utility of this 
conceptualisation (see Carothers, 2002; O’Donnell, 2002), it provides a useful 
framework within which more detailed analysis can take place. Central to any 
democratisation process is the transition stage, as this clears the space for the new 
political order to emerge. Recent analyses have argued that transitions from non-
democratic regimes do not automatically result in democracy, with some states 
moving towards new forms of non-democratic regime type or developing relatively 
stable semi-democratic hybrid systems (Bogaards, 2009; Levitsky and Way, 2010). 
The divergent trajectories are determined by the existing social and political context, 
as well as the character of the regime change itself. 
 Prior non-democratic regime type is an important factor influencing form of 
democratisation, determining the context within which change takes place. Significant 
features of prior regime type include the formal institutional architecture to be 
reformed, as well as values and patterns of behaviour that were introduced and 
entrenched during the non-democratic period (Hite and Morlino, 2004). Three factors 
have been identified in determining the strength of these legacies: durability of the 
non-democratic regime, the level of institutional innovation, and the mode of 
transition (Hite and Morlino, 2004). Institutional innovation is significant in this 
context, as it captures the extent to which the non-democratic regime was able to 
introduce changes that reflected and reinforced its particular vision. Therefore, 
democratising an innovative regime will require more extensive work to overcome 
and reform the embedded institutional patterns. Comparing totalitarian and 
authoritarian regimes, it is clear that the former involves more extensive innovation in 
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this regard, as the goal of the regime is to establish total control over society (see Linz 
and Stepan, 1996; Shapiro, 1972; Thompson, 2002). 
The form of the prior (non-democratic) regime influences the ability of the 
state to democratise and the rate at which this happens. Distinctions between regimes 
derive from the level of public participation and the extent of state institutionalisation 
(Huntington, 1968). These measures provide a means to distinguish between 
authoritarian and totalitarian political systems. Authoritarian regimes maintain control 
through the deactivation and exclusion of independent/outside actors (O’Donnell, 
1979), while totalitarian regimes encourage higher levels of participation within 
carefully established and monitored limits (Arendt, 1966). The degree of 
institutionalisation is greater in totalitarian regimes, due to the need for control, but 
also grows in authoritarian regimes over time, as they routinise control. Different 
regime types will therefore have an impact on the ability of the democratising regime 
to introduce change. 
The mode of transition is important in determining the direction of the 
democratisation process and the structure of the political system that can be 
established. Whereas the prior regime type provides the base from which 
democratisation must proceed, the mode of transition determines the manner in which 
democratisation proceeds. Addressing this point, Munck and Leff (1997, 343-45) 
argue that: 
the mode of transition affects the form of the posttransitional regime and 
politics through its influence on the pattern of elite competition, on the 
institutional rules crafted during transition, and on key actors’ acceptance or 
rejection of the rules of the game. 
Elite actors play the central role in the democratisation process; although they may 
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not be directly responsible for initiating change, they direct the subsequent 
development. This point is illustrated by Tarrow’s (1995, 205) analysis of 
democratisation in Spain, noting that while ‘[t]he mass public rumbles in the wings; 
the actors on stage are the elites.’ It is therefore important to ask what pushed the 
change ‘beyond the intentions of the autocratic incumbents and/or the initially limited 
powers of their opponents.’ (Schneider and Schmitter, 2004, 66) This requires 
identification of the source of the shift from non-democratic liberalisation to 
democratisation. The distinction can be drawn between an elite initiated (negotiated) 
process and one that is driven from below by mass opposition or non-elite actors 
(convulsive). Although the democratisation process opens the system to greater public 
participation over time, the extent and form of this participation is shaped by the 
system that is constructed early in the democratisation period. 
Internal regime dynamics are central in determining the way in which the 
transition takes place, but external actors can also play an important role in 
influencing decision-making processes. The support of the EU has been a significant 
factor in the decisions taken at this level in South and Southeastern Europe, through 
the imposition of conditionality during the democratisation period (Dimitrova and 
Pridham, 2004; Pridham, 2007). In order to gain membership, prospective member 
states were required to align their policies and practices with those of the EU. 
However, the growth in the breadth and depth of the regulations has obliged the EU to 
accept limitations on the ability of states to implement the full acquis communautaire 
on accession (Inglis, 2004). The willingness of the EU to partially overlook the 
limitations of prospective members is due to the importance of the expected 
normative influence of membership.  
 Effective state capacity is essential for the development and implementation of 
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environmental policies and practices. Cummings and Nørgaard (2004) identify four 
dimensions of state capacity: ideational, political, technical, and implementational. 
The first two dimensions refer to the state's perceived legitimacy and its ability “to 
conduct a coherent policy and... to secure resources from both domestic and 
international society in the design of policy” (Cummings and Nørgaard, 2004, 688). 
For states undergoing democratisation and possessing limited domestic capacity, 
external actors (such as the EU) can provide important support and guidance in 
building capacity. Alongside policy development, the state also requires intellectual 
and organisational resources to ensure that the decisions are enacted through formal 
technical and implementational dimensions of state capacity (Cummings and 
Nørgaard, 2004).  
 Examining state capacity during democratisation, Bäck and Hadenius (2008, 
2) identify a U-shaped relationship, arguing that during the initial stages 
administrative capacity declines, and recovery is not seen until higher levels of 
democracy are reached. Effective capacity building relies on the “simultaneous 
establishment of democratic institutions and the development of vital political societal 
resources.” (Bäck and Hadenius, 2008, 21) Strengthening domestic institutions will 
give the appearance of increased state capacity, but without stable participation and 
oversight it is not possible to ensure elite accountability. Reform of institutional 
structures is necessary but not sufficient to lead to stronger capacity, particularly in 
the area of environmental policy. The weakness of communist era environmental 
agencies in Eastern Europe revealed the difference between formal and substantive 
institutionalisation. Jänicke (2002, 8-9; see also Mikhova and Pickles, 1994) argues 
that environmental institutions in these countries “neither had stringently protected 
jurisdictions nor support from a strong ecology movement or an independent media.” 
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To be effective, changes in the institutional pattern “must be understood as part of a 
deeper process of cultural transformation.” (Barry, 1999, 209) Dimitrova (2010) 
supports this point in relation to Eastern Europe, arguing that although the states in 
the region have adopted the formal requirements of the EU, informal rules and 
practices have been much slower to change. 
 Although the state may possess the formal capacity to address environmental 
issues, it will not necessarily do so unless there are sufficient incentives. This is 
particularly difficult in a period of democratisation where uncertainty presents many 
competing claims and pressures. This issue is captured by Carmin and VanDeveer 
(2005, 12) who argue that: 
While capacity development requires well-trained and well-equipped personnel, it is 
also essential to have effective and efficient governmental and non-governmental 
organisations to establish appropriate institutional environments in which these 
organisations can operate. 
Capacity in this area therefore moves beyond the state and must incorporate the role 
and influence of non-governmental actors as well as competing internal interests. 
Examining levels of access and influence of such actors can provide a way of 
understanding of broader environmental capacity.  
 The development of environmental capacity in a democratising state will 
therefore be determined by the nature of the institutions that are created and the ability 
of actors to participate. In turn, these aspects will be shaped by the extent and form of 
non-democratic legacy that persists. The support provided by external actors will be 
filtered through domestic structures and perspectives (see Dimitrova, 2010; Goetz, 
2001). The relationship between the variables is represented in Figure 1. Before 
examining the situation in the selected countries, the article introduces the 
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methodology used to capture domestic developments. 
 
Figure 1 – Relationship between Democratisation and Environmental Capacity 
 
 
Methodology 
Twenty six interviews were conducted with members of environmental NGOs, 
government officials, and academic experts in the four countries, as well as experts 
based outside the countries. The interviews were conducted between January and 
August 2007 and were recorded and transcribed by the author. The interviews 
followed a semi-structured format aiming to capture a broad perspective of 
environmental politics in each country. Interview questions addressed issues of 
environmental policy, effects of democratisation, public participation, environmental 
NGO activities, media, state administrative mechanisms, and the influence of the EU. 
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All interviews were consulted in the preparation of this article.  
In order to gain contextual understanding of the interview material, this project 
incorporated analysis of key legislative developments in the area of environmental 
regulation and management, in addition to data on environmental indicators, 
governance, and democracy. Legislative developments provide an insight into 
changes in the approach of the formal state apparatus in response to changes in the 
domestic and international political context during the non-democratic period and 
subsequently. An examination of environmental indicators alongside measures of 
governance and democracy enables identification of respective changes over time.  
 
Effect of democratisation on environmental capacity development in southern 
Europe 
 This section examines the details of the prior regime type and mode of 
transition in each of the four countries, as represented in Table 1. The section also 
considers the key mechanisms (policy and administration) introduced to address and 
manage environmental issues and the countries’ respective positions on public 
participation. 
 
Table 1 – Key Regime Characteristics 
 Bulgaria Portugal Romania Spain 
Regime Type Totalitarian Authoritarian Totalitarian Authoritarian 
Duration 1946-1989 1926-1974 1948-1989 1936-1975 
Mode of Transition Negotiated Convulsive Convulsive Negotiated 
EU Member 2007 1986 2007 1986 
 
Bulgaria 
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 The regime of Todor Zhivkov and the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) was 
organised around a centrally controlled economic system with a focus on rapid 
industrialisation (McIntyre, 1988). Expressions of dissent were dealt with harshly by 
the regime, significantly reducing the space for opposition outside of state 
organisations (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Immobility in the political system led to 
growing frustration among the population, as the country experienced economic 
stagnation, environmental degradation and dissent within the Turkish minority (Bell, 
1997). Faced with this opposition and changes in the wider region, the BCP forced 
Zhivkov to resign in November 1989, in order to maintain control over the process of 
regime change (Giatzidis, 2002). Central to this process were roundtable talks 
involving the BCP, emerging opposition parties, representatives of the Turkish 
minority, and nationalist groups (Crampton, 1997). These talks ended the dominance 
of the BCP and opened the political space to competition. 
 The removal of the BCP regime presented an opportunity to deal with the 
environmental degradation of the communist period, particularly as the environmental 
organisation Ekoglasnost2 was part of the first post-communist government (Baker 
and Baumgartl, 1998). Initial signs were positive in the formulation of environmental 
protection measures. The 1991 Constitution acknowledged state responsibility 
(Article 15) and citizen rights (Article 55) in relation to the environment.3 This was 
followed by the Environmental Protection Law, which aimed to standardise practices 
and establish a framework for subsequent regulations (O’Brien, 2009a).4 Specific 
sectoral laws were subsequently introduced to build on the framework law in areas of 
air,5 water,6 environmental impact assessments (EIA),7 and protected territories.8 
Although these regulations represented progress, they were driven by pressure from 
the EU and were not seen as priorities. Discussing environmental administration, an 
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academic (Interview, UK, 11 April 2007) argued ‘you have got a tremendous 
revolution in environmental regulation, on the other hand, you have a tendency to 
fudge the issue, to chop and change, to ignore where needs must’. It was also noted by 
NGO representatives that much of this results from the reactive stance of the state 
administration (Interview, Sofia, 1 June 2007) and lack of motivated staff (Interview, 
Sofia, 16 May 2007). 
 Ineffective administrative structures have led people to turn to informal 
networks based on kinship, common interests, or professional collegiality as an 
alternative (Bojicic-Dzelilovic and Bojkov, 2005). This translates to low levels of 
action on environmental issues due to a feeling of inability to affect change, and the 
economic burden imposed by democratisation (Cellarius and Staddon, 2002). This 
appears to be changing as the economic and political situation stabilises (Interviews 
NGO representatives, Sofia, 16 and 21 May 2007). The feeling of inability to affect 
change was also shaped by the nature of the NGO sector, with the lack of domestic 
sources of funding leading groups to turn to foreign donors, weakening links with 
domestic actors (Cellarius and Staddon, 2002). With the passage of time, the sector 
has consolidated and a number of credible organisations have emerged. Discussing 
the perception of NGOs, a representative (Interview, Sofia, 21 May 2007) argued that 
‘if some people start to work on specific problems…when they finish with the 
procedures and see that non-one is dealing with their problems, they are coming to 
NGOs.’ Relations with the state remain difficult and there is a perception that NGOs 
are not seen as credible partners, being invited to participate where the environmental 
agencies need support in challenging other agencies (Interview, NGO representative, 
Sofia, 21 May 2007) or on issues that are not seen as important (Interview, NGO 
representative, Sofia, 16 May 2007).
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Portugal 
 The regime of Antonio Salazar and Marcelo Caetano was based on a 
traditionalist ideology (Estado Novo) that promoted organic unity within society 
(Wiarda and Mott, 2001). In order to maintain the system, the regime relied on 
institutional structures provided by the military, including extensive repressive 
apparatus, censorship and control of access to the public administration (Costa Pinto, 
2003). Despite drawing on military institutions, regime elites remained wary and 
attempted to limit the influence of the military in politics. Following the death of 
Salazar in 1968, Caetano assumed the role of president, but his relative weakness 
forced him to continue the policies of his predecessor, including unpopular colonial 
wars in Angola and Mozambique (Maxwell, 1986). Regime change was initiated by 
coup d’état on 25 April 1974 when a group of junior and mid-level officers (MFA – 
Movimento das Forças Armadas) seized power (Bermeo, 2007). The MFA was 
divided following the coup and the low level rank of the coup plotters challenged the 
internal hierarchy of the military, leading it to support democratisation as a way of 
withdrawing from the political sphere (Linz and Stepan, 1996). However, the relative 
weakness of civil society actors meant that democratisation was dominated and 
controlled by elite actors (Costa Pinto, 2006). 
 Environmental policy was slow to enter the political agenda following the 
removal of the Salazar-Caetano regime. This was partly due to the perception fostered 
by the authoritarian regime that Portugal was had an unspoilt environment (Interview 
Academic, Lisbon, 2 April 2007). The 1976 Constitution reinforced this view, with 
Article 9[d] requiring the state to promote ‘economic, social, cultural and 
environmental rights by means of the transformation and modernisation of economic 
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and social structures.’9 The focus on economic modernisation also restricted the 
emergence of environmental policies. In 1987, the Environment Basic Act10 (EBA) 
was introduced to act as framework legislation could build upon (see O’Brien, 2009a). 
Ribeiro and Rodrigues (1997) argue that the character and content of the EBA 
reflected the outcome of the Brundtland Report and was aligned with emerging EU 
policies. Discussing the nature of environmental policy in Portugal, an Academic 
(Interview, Lisbon, 7 August 2007) argued that: 
Portugal in terms of environmental public policy has all the exterior signs of a public 
policy… The main problem lies, in my opinion of course, in the performing 
capabilities of those environmental policies, and the emphasis that is given tin the 
capacity of implementing the policies, enforcing legal statutes 
The weakness of the environmental agencies was also confirmed by a state official 
(Interview, Lisbon, 9 August 2007) arguing that, until the 1990s, the environmental 
agency was like an NGO, fighting for its position. It has also been noted that the 
relatively closed nature of the administrative system has undermined communication 
and understanding (Gonçalves, 2002; Interview Academic, Lisbon, 2 April 2007). 
Regional and municipal agencies, which have responsibility for waste, water, 
sanitation and planning, are also identified as a problem, as stretched local budgets 
and limited technical expertise lead to wide variations and undermine effective 
implementation (Interview NGO representative, Lisbon, 3 April 2007). 
 Public participation on environmental issues has been limited in Portugal 
reflecting the way ‘[c]ivil society was controlled by the means of corporatist 
structures, which allowed only for a limited and partial representation of popular 
interests’ under the Salazar-Caetano regime (Hamman and Manuel, 1999, 90). The 
difficulties of participation are captured by the attitude of the state, with an academic 
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(Interview, Lisbon, 2 April 2007) arguing  
it’s very difficult to participate, because when people try to, for instance in 
environmental impact assessment, they try to intervene making a report about that 
and at the end… nothing is reflected in the final decision. 
 Environmental NGOs have begun to exert more pressure on the state, adopting 
professionalised methods and organisational forms. This has been particularly 
challenging given the limited resources available, with an NGO representative 
(Interview, Lisbon, 1 August 2007) noting ‘Portugal doesn’t have a lot of 
money…what the government says to us to do, “go look for money someplace else, 
we don’t have it.”’ This pressure to generate income has limited the ability of the 
main NGOs to cooperate on specific projects (Interview State official, 9 August 2007) 
and arguably weakened connections to the grassroots. Despite these challenges, it was 
argued that the NGOs have a ‘qualitative impact’ in specific areas such as waste and 
natural reserves through their sectoral specialities and use of the media (Interview 
Academic, Lisbon, 7 August 2007). 
 
Romania 
 The Romanian political system under Nicolae Ceauşescu was arguably one of 
the most restrictive in Eastern Europe. Discussing the source of control, Deletant 
(1993, 3) argued that 
terror embraced the whole of Romanian society, searching for actual or potential 
opponents of totalitarian conformity, and imparting to many the sense that they were 
being hunted. After 1964 Romanians were marked by fear, rather than terror, of the 
Securitate [State Security Department] and the Ceauşescu regime. 
The purpose of control was to modernise and industrialise Romania, although the 
regime became ‘increasingly contradictory, erratic and personalistically 
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opportunistic.’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996, 354) This was reflected in the shift to 
industrialisation on a grand scale, including an attempt to remove the rural/urban 
divide, by bulldozing 7000 villages and moving the population to high rise apartment 
blocks (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Where opposition emerged it was brutally suppressed 
and geographically constrained, such as when industrial workers in Braşov struck in 
1987, demanding meat, bread and milk (Tismaneanu, 2003).11 The end of the regime 
followed escalating protests beginning in December 1989; the unfocused nature of the 
opposition allowed regime elites to seize control from (and execute) Ceauşescu and 
establish control over the initial democratisation (Hall, 2000). 
 The excesses of the Ceauşescu regime left a significantly degraded natural 
environment, with few mechanisms to remedy problems. The first step was the 1991 
Constitution, which acknowledged the right of the population to a healthy 
environment (Article 35[1]) and the role of the state in developing legislation 
(35[2]).12 Economic pressures meant that environmental issues were viewed as a 
necessary evil during the early transition period (Botcheva, 1996). In 1995 the 
framework Law on Environmental Protection (LPM) was introduced, replacing a 
communist-era law and setting out mechanisms for implementation.13 Specific 
sectoral laws followed on issues such as forests,14 water,15 and protected areas.16 The 
content of these laws demonstrated recognition of the need to balance economic and 
environmental pressures. Many of the changes introduced during this period were 
made in the face of pressure from the EU, with an NGO representative (Interview, 
Bucharest, 27 June 2007) arguing 
I used to think that the EU is the only whip that you can use to move something in 
this country… it’s not the only one, but it was one of the most powerful. 
While the EU has encouraged progress, it was argued that change is not always 
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meaningful. The Ministry of Waters, Forests and Environmental Protection was 
created (in 1991) to satisfy EU demands, but lacks strategic direction (Interview NGO 
representative, Bucharest, 27 June 2007) and remains weak relative to the economic 
agencies (Interview NGO representative, Bucharest, 20 June 2007). Administrative 
weakness is also noted at the local level, with Sofroniciu (2005) arguing that 
implementation has been hampered by poor oversight and lack of capacity. Regional 
and local environmental agencies have limited impact, with an NGO representative 
(Interview, Bucharest, 20 June 2007) arguing they have been asked to smooth the way 
for business, rather than seek improvements.  
The level of public participation has remained low in Romania following the 
removal of the Ceauşescu regime. The Constitution acknowledges the right of the 
population to obtain information: Article 31[1] states that access to information of 
public interest shall not be restricted. The public authorities are in turn required to 
provide information to the citizens (Article 31[2]). In relation to the environment, 
Article 5[a] of the LPM requires the state to guarantee the right to access information 
on the environment. In addition, Article 5[c] guarantees: 
the right of being consulted in the decision-making regarding the development of 
environmental policies, legislation and regulations, the issuing of environmental 
agreements and permits, including for territorial and urban planning. 
Together, these show the rights of the population to obtain and make use of 
information without fear of prejudice from the state, indicating a significant shift. 
Where public participation does take place its efficacy has been questioned, with an 
NGO representative (Interview, Bucharest, 27 June 2007) noting: 
Public administration sometimes organises public hearings where NGOs are involved 
and citizens are involved and then when you look at the transcription of the 
discussions, you didn’t say anything. 
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The result of this is that people are not aware of their rights with regard to public 
participation, and where they do become involved there is a perception that it will not 
have any effect on the outcome (Interview, NGO representative, Bucharest, 20 June 
2007). Parau (2009, 125) notes that locals opposing the proposed Roşia Montană gold 
mine were 'were not only unaccustomed but actually fearful of challenging state 
authority.' Analysis conducted on non-voting political activity indicates that there was 
a decline between 1996 and 2004, the period at which the democratisation process 
was beginning to consolidate (Sum, 2005). This is a challenging issue; during the 
initial democratisation period, civil society was weak due to lack of history, yet the 
level of engagement has not increased substantially as the democratisation process has 
stabilised.  
 
Spain 
 Democratisation in Spain followed the death of General Franco in November 
1975. The Franco regime exercised control through repression to control dissent and 
corporatist structures to co-opt economically important actors, such as trade unions 
(Pierson, 1999). This combined strategy can be seen in the introduction of emergency 
powers and legislation allowing associations to ‘formulate and contrast legitimate 
opinion’ during 1969 (Preston, 1986, 14-5). Adopting a dual strategy enabled the 
regime to generate legitimacy while maintaining control over those that dissented. 
The result was that by the time of Franco’s death, ‘the population had…experience 
with a relatively well functioning and open market economy, a legal framework that 
allowed room for this market and for a plethora of voluntary associations’ (Pérez-Díaz, 
1999, 174-5). With the death of Franco the regime democratised under the guidance 
of the Presidente Aldolfo Suárez. A regime insider, Suárez had to navigate between 
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hardliners determined to maintain control and reformers recognising the need for 
change (O’Brien, 2007). The result, as noted by Tarrow (1995; see also Threlfall, 
2008), was an elite dominated democratisation process, in which civil society actors 
played a supporting role. 
 Environmental policy saw limited development during the Franco regime, 
with a focus on limiting obvious sources of damage. The opening that came with 
democratisation presented an opportunity for change. Discussing environmental 
policy, an NGO representative (Interview, Madrid, 18 July 2007) identified three 
periods: before the 1978 Constitution (limited policy), before the 1986 accession 
(increasing domestic policy) and after accession (implementation of European 
regulations). The 1978 Constitution17 was an important milestone, as it set out the 
right to suitable environment (Article 45(1)) and basic legal responsibilities of the 
state (Article 149). Although this set a new tone, progress was slow, with a senior 
NGO representative (Interview, Madrid, 18 July 2007) describing the election of the 
Socialist government in 1982 as initiating a ‘lost decade’. Despite these reservations, 
legislation addressing water18, EIAs19, coastal areas20, and conservation of natural 
areas21 were introduced during this period.  More significant was membership of the 
EU. The point was made that Spain did not negotiate a transition period or opt-outs in 
this area, so was required to introduce all relevant regulations immediately (Interview 
NGO representative, Madrid, 18 July 2007). Costa (2006) argues that, over time, 
Spain has moved from being a policy taker to an active challenger on environmental 
regulation. This reluctance has also been noted on the ground with an academic 
(Interview, Madrid, 18 July 2007) noting ‘people pay a lot of attention to the passing 
of a law, but then forget about it.’ This points to weaknesses in implementation, 
related to tension between central and local government (Interview NGO 
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representative, Madrid, 17 July 2007; Interview State Official, Madrid, 2 March 2007) 
and a willingness to bypass existing regulations (Pardo, 1997). 
 Legacies from the authoritarian regime are apparent in the area of public 
participation. Although there is legislation22 in place to facilitate participation, its 
effect has been restricted by unwillingness of the state to encourage such action and 
hesitance among the population to get involved (Todt, 1999). Addressing the state’s 
approach, Börzel (1998, 73) has argued that: 
Spanish environmental policymaking reflects a reactive problem-solving approach 
which relies heavily on regulatory, command and control instruments and where the 
‘costs’ of environmental protection are weighed against the ‘benefits’ of economic 
development. 
This formalised structure has also been compounded by the practice of social 
concertation, which has sought to institutionalise consultation and cooperation (see 
Royo, 2005). Central to this approach was the establishment in 1994 of the 
Environmental Advisory Council (Consejo Asesor de Medio Ambiente), which brings 
‘together NGOs, trade unions, consumers, scientific and business representatives to 
comment on policies on the environment and sustainable development.’ (O’Brien, 
2009b, 149) In order to function in this context, environmental NGOs have adopted 
an increasingly professionalised form (see O’Brien, 2009b). Professionalisation has 
allowed the national groups to establish distinct areas of competence (Interview NGO 
representative, Madrid, 17 July 2007) and also facilitated cooperation with local 
organisations (Jiménez, 2007). 
 
The Impact of Democratisation on Outcomes 
 Each of the countries considered in this article has made progress in 
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introducing mechanisms to manage environmental issues. The analysis of the cases 
has shown that the implementation of these measures has varied considerably, 
between countries and over time. Lack of effective enforcement was a common 
refrain, with pressures to increase economic performance outweighing the need to 
ensure that environmental policy was implemented. Although democratisation opened 
the space for a range of civil society actors to emerge, exclusionary practices (albeit 
on a far lesser scale) combined with societal wariness continued to preclude greater 
public participation in policymaking. The EU emerged as a significant influence on 
the development and introduction of environmental policies and practices in each of 
the countries. Changes in the priorities and goals of the EU over time led to different 
pressures being placed on countries in the two regions, with Bulgaria and Romania 
facing more stringent pre-accession criteria before joining in 2007. 
 Having identified these trends across the countries, it is important to examine 
indicators that can determine whether the changes outlined have translated to 
improvements in environmental outcomes. To this end, this article now considers 
changes in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (metric tons per capita) alongside changes 
in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita over the period leading up to and 
following democratisation.23 The use of CO2 in the analysis is justified by its ubiquity 
as an output of modern industrial processes and societies. As a climate gas, CO2 
emissions are also a frequent target for reduction or management at the national, 
regional and global level, as illustrated by efforts to develop carbon capture and 
storage technologies (Tjernshaugen, 2011) and the ongoing debate over nuclear 
energy (Duffy, 2011). This visibility and perceived importance implies that reductions 
of CO2 emissions correspond to other efforts to limit environmental degradation. 
Considering GDP alongside changes in CO2 emissions allows for an examination of 
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relative resource intensity24 of economic development in each country, with 
divergence potentially signalling improved effectiveness of enforcement measures. 
 The figures below show variation in emissions patterns in relation to GDP 
across the two regions. Emissions in Portugal and Spain (Figure 1) have tracked GDP 
across the period under consideration. The exceptions to this pattern occurred from 
the initiation of the democratisation process in Spain, when there was a temporary and 
marked increase in CO2 emissions despite a slowdown in GDP growth. This may have 
represented a drive to boost economic performance and break free from the legacy of 
the Franco regime. The drop in emissions at the end of the period would seem to 
reflect the initial impact of the global financial crisis and a related slow-down in 
manufacturing and construction. Portugal’s pattern was similar to that of Spain, but 
moving in a more consistent manner. The overall pattern would appear to show that, 
with the exception of Spain’s brief increase in emissions intensity, both countries 
were relatively unaffected by the democratisation process, maintaining a stable 
growth in emissions and GDP. 
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Figure 2: CO2 (mt per capita) and GDP (per capita) Portugal and Spain (1965-2009) 
Source: The World Bank DataBank - 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselection/selectvariables.aspx?source=worl
d-development-indicators [Accessed 22 March 2013] 
 
 The situations in Bulgaria and Romania (Figure 2) were more complicated and 
varied. In each country, the onset of democratisation saw significant falls in CO2 
emissions and GDP. This can be linked to the closure or privatisation of large and 
inefficient state-owned enterprises favoured by the prior regimes (see Fidrmuc, 2003). 
During the early democratisation period, both indicators remained relatively low, with 
GDP growth beginning to return in a consistent manner only in 2000. By contrast, 
CO2 emissions fell slightly from 1996 and remained low despite the onset of 
economic recovery in 2000. This pattern would appear to suggest the influence of the 
EU, as pressure to conform to conditionality (addressing environmental issues) was 
matched with increased opportunities in the economic sphere, resulting from the 
prospect of impending membership. Although foreign direct investment provided 
support in restructuring industries and supported efficiencies that would reduce 
emissions, the bulk of this investment came after 2003, when the divergence between 
CO2 emissions and GDP was already established (see Kalotay, 2008). 
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Figure 3: CO2 (mt per capita) and GDP (per capita) Bulgaria and Romania (1980-
2009) 
Source: The World Bank DataBank - 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselection/selectvariables.aspx?source=worl
d-development-indicators [Accessed 22 March 2013] 
 
 The case studies and figures present a mixed picture regarding the relationship 
between democratisation and environmental capacity. There have been improvements 
in environmental policy development and institutional creation in all of the countries 
during the democratisation period. In each case, this signified an improvement on 
performance of the preceding non-democratic regime. The cases also show a degree 
of consistency in the development of formal environmental capacity, with rights and 
responsibilities enshrined in new constitutional documents leading to environmental 
policies in the relevant areas. However, the implementation and enforcement of these 
new regulations was perceived to be undermined by a lack of political will to 
undermine economic performance. The lack of sustained improvement was apparent 
in the CO2 emissions data in Portugal and Spain, although in Bulgaria and Romania 
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the picture would appear to be slightly more positive. 
 Turning to the effect of prior regime type and mode of transition on 
environmental performance during democratisation, the relationship is more evident. 
Within the regions it made little difference whether the regime change was initiated 
by a sudden shock (convulsive) or negotiated by regime elites. The greatest variation 
during the initial democratisation period was across the regions, with Bulgaria and 
Portugal seeing a significant fall in CO2 emissions following the regime change, while 
in Spain and Portugal there was little change (with the exception of Spain’s initial 
increase). Drawing on the case study analysis, this can be linked to the prior regime 
type, as the intense focus on rapid industrialisation and central control in the 
Southeast European states provided the conditions that enabled a more substantial fall 
following democratisation. In Southern Europe, the less intensive form of 
industrialisation and market economy meant that the break with the past was far less 
radical. This suggests that the prior regime type has a role to play in shaping 
environmental outcomes during democratisation. 
 Finally, the EU played a key role in the environmental politics of all four of 
the countries. Pressure to implement EU directives and meet conditionality led to 
improvements in formal policy structures. The difference between the two regions is 
that the earlier accession of Portugal and Spain allowed them to gain entry before 
environmental issues entered the EU’s core political agenda. This provided some 
room for manoeuvre from within, as they were able to adapt and develop their 
environmental capacity as part of the wider EU effort to address environmental issues. 
Conditionality was more important for Bulgaria and Romania and exerted influence 
on their domestic policymaking.25 This was reflected in the case studies, as well as in 
the data, as CO2 emissions and GDP began to diverge from the late 1990s, when they 
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were seeking to “catch up” with the other Eastern European states in their drive for 
membership. Although implementation of environmental regulations has been lacking 
in all of the countries, the EU has been an important actor driving the development of 
these policies forward. 
 
Conclusion 
Democratisation provides an opportunity for a state to strengthen its environmental 
capacity. Capacity in this regard refers to the extent to which the state is seen as a 
legitimate actor and also possesses the necessary intellectual and organisational 
resources to ensure that decisions taken are enacted. Moving towards democracy 
involves the creation of institutions and mechanisms that are more able to utilise 
feedback and adapt to changes in the external environment.  
This article has assessed the effect of both prior regime type and mode of transition 
on environmental capacity, through consideration of the cases of Bulgaria, Portugal, Romania 
and Spain. The findings demonstrate that, although totalitarian regimes exercise a 
greater degree of control over social, political and economic spheres than 
authoritarian political systems, this does not appear to hinder the development of 
environmental capacity. The extent of reform and reconstruction is more extensive in 
totalitarian regimes, but the nature of the reforms required means that changes take 
time to embed, regardless of the prior regime type. Differences in the mode of 
transition (convulsive versus negotiated) in the cases examined also appeared to have 
had limited impact on subsequent development of environmental capacity. This is 
consistent with the argument made by Bäck and Hadenius (2008), that 
democratisation is a period of instability regardless of the mode of transition. 
Although there may be some limited gains in the short-term from the greater stability 
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associated with negotiated regime changes, these are mitigated by the slower pace at 
which the system can be restructured. 
 Similarities in the experiences of the four countries appear to derive from two 
key factors. The first is the length of time that the non-democratic regime was in 
power. In each case, the preceding non-democratic regime was in power for at least 
40 years, sufficient to deeply embed norms and practices associated with the non-
democratic regime. This has been illustrated in the difficulties faced by civil society 
actors in attempting to engage with the democratised states, as hierarchical and elitist 
patterns have continued. Experiences under the non-democratic regime left extensive 
legacies that continued to shape behaviours within the state and society, long after 
democratisation had been initiated. Secondly, the cases also indicate the importance 
of external actors in shaping the emerging democratic political system. In particular, 
support provided by the EU ensured that environmental policies and practices were 
introduced during the early democratisation and were maintained as the respective 
political systems consolidated. The priorities of the EU meant that the regimes also 
converged in how they dealt with environmental issues and management. It is also 
important to note that, although the EU has required the adoption of policies, 
institutions and practices to improve environmental capacity, there are areas of 
weakness. Problems of implementation are important in this regard, as the countries 
introduced change without enforcement mechanisms and popular support necessary to 
ensure effectiveness. As Goetz (2001) notes, policies and directives from the 
European level are filtered through the lens of domestic priorities, thereby limiting the 
extent to which European priorities can be embedded. 
 In conclusion, the findings indicate that there is a generally positive 
relationship between democratisation and environmental capacity. Support from the 
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EU was crucial in ensuring that environmental issues remained on the domestic 
political agenda during democratisation. The findings also suggest that without 
sufficient domestic political will to support the development of environmental 
capacity progress will be limited. Non-democratic legacies play an important role in 
this regard, shaping the manner in which policy is developed and participation by 
non-state actors is perceived. 
 
                                                 
1 While it has been argued that an eco-authoritarian regime could more effectively address issues of 
environmental degradation (see Orr and Hill, 1978) the abdication of citizen responsibility would 
undermine the aims over the long-term (see Barry, 1996; Paehlke, 1995) 
2 Ekoglasnost emerged in March 1989 to protest pollution in the town of Ruse, but expanded its focus 
following repression and was the most visible civil society organisation in the pre-democratisation 
period (Baumgartl, 1992). 
3 Constitution Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria - http://www.online.bg/law/const/const0.htm 
[Accessed 13/02/2008] 
4 326/1991 - Environmental Protection Law  - http://archive.bild.net/legislation/docs/9/epa.html 
[Accessed 19/03/2013] 
5 45/1996 - Law Purity of Atmospheric Air - http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/bul42717.doc [Accessed 
19/03/2013] 
6 67/1999 - Water Law - http://www.geology.bas.bg/admin/LW.pdf [Accessed 19/03/2013] 
7 4/1998 - Decree on Environmental Impact Assessment - 
http://www.moew.government.bg/recent_doc/legislation/horisontal/en/EIA%20Ordinance%20(English
%20translation).doc [Accessed 19/03/2013] 
8 133/1998 - Law for the Protected Territories - 
http://www.moew.government.bg/recent_doc/legislation/natural_prot/en/Protected%20Areas%20Act.d
oc [19/03/2013] 
9 Constitution of the Republic of Portugal - 
http://app.parlamento.pt/site_antigo/ingles/cons_leg/Constitution_VII_revisao_definitive.pdf 
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[Accessed 20/03/2013] 
10 11/87 - Environmental Basic Act (Lei de Bases do Ambiente) http://www.iapmei.pt/iapmei-leg-
03.php?lei=162 [Accessed 6/02/2008] 
11 One exception was the 1977 strike by Jiu Valley miners, which saw Ceauşescu visit the region and 
agree to the demands. Vasi (2004) argues that this was a result of the strength of overlapping social 
networks in the region, that allowed the formation of strong bonds of trust that were absent in other 
industrial regions. 
12 Constitution of the Republic of Romania http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=339&idl=2 
[Accessed 19/02/2008] 
13 137/1995 - Law on Environmental Protection (Legea Proteţiei Mediului) - 
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/rom13258E.doc [Accessed 19/02/2008] 
14 26/1996 - Forest Code (Legea Codul Silvic) 
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=4870 [Accessed 19/02/2008] 
15 107/1996 - Water Law (Legea Apelor) – 
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=9273 [Accessed 19/02/2008] 
16 5/2000 - Law Approving Planning of Arrangement of National Territory – Protected Areas (Legea 
privind Aprobarea Planului de Amenajare a Teritoriului Naţional – Zone Protejate) 
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act?ida=24158 [accessed 19/02/2008] 
17 Constitution of Spain - 
http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/IDIOMAS/9/Espana/LeyFundamental/index.htm [Accessed 18/03/2013] 
18 29/1985 - Water Law (Ley de Aguas) http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1985-16661 
[Accessed 18/03/2013] 
19 1302/1986 - Royal Decree on Environmental Impact Assessment (Real Decreto Legislativo de 
Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental) http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1986-17240 
[Accessed 18/03/2013] 
20 22/1988 – Coastal Law (Ley de Costas) http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1988-18762 
[Accessed 30/01/2008] 
21 4/1989 - Law of Conservation of Natural Spaces and Wild Flora and Fauna (Ley de Conservación de 
los Espacios Naturales y de la Flora y Fauna Silvestre) http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-
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1989-6881 [Accessed 18/03/2013] 
22 For much of the period participation was covered by the Constitution and 28/1995 - Law on the 
Right of Access to Information in the Matter of Environment (Ley sobre el derecho de Acceso a la 
Información en Materia de Medio Ambiente) http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1995-
26838 [Accessed 18/03/2013] 
23 The figures present the two regions separately for two reasons. Portugal and Spain democratised 
earlier than Bulgaria and Romania, so a longer time series of emissions and GDP data is considered to 
capture the non-democratic period. Secondly, GDP per capita varies significantly between the two 
regions, with Bulgaria and Romania at a much lower level than Portugal and Spain. Emissions for the 
countries in the two regions were quite similar, with Bulgaria and Romania starting from a higher level 
before democratisation and coinciding with those of Portugal and Spain from the early 1990s.  
24 Using the Environmental Kuznets Curve, Dinda (2004) shows that environmental degradation 
increases until a certain level of economic development is reached, beyond which degradation begins to 
fall. Reasons for the fall can be attributed to the move away from reliance on material-energy intensive 
production towards less intensive, post-material production, in line with rising environmental 
consciousness. 
25 In addition to formal requirements, the EU introduced measures to provide support to civil society 
organisations to build capacity. The Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe 
played an important role in this area by channelling grants until the mid-1990s and then supporting 
policymaking through its network of country offices (see O’Brien, 2010). 
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